Donald Friedman petitioned the agency to reconsider its decision to allow the sled test alternative even on a temporary basis. He argued that the problem of fatalities in low-speed air bag deployment crashes arose because some motor vehicle manufacturers failed to fully meet their legal responsibilities, that NHTSA responded belatedly and inappropriately with an amendment that will not prevent some of the low speed crash deployment fatalities, that the sled test amendment compromises the safety purpose of Standard No. 208 so that the standard no longer meets the need for motor vehicle safety, and that the agency had not formally considered all reasonable, available alternatives.
Mr. Friedman asked that the rulemaking be reopened with a broader spectrum of proposed options. He stated that NHTSA should not take at face value the industry's claim that the only way it can respond to the current situation is to depower air bags. The petitioner stated that, at a minimum, the options should include (1) making no change in the standard while encouraging manufacturers to raise the minimum crash speed at which air bags deploy, (2) recommending under any depowering option that manufacturers use more effective belt-use inducements in their new vehicles, and (3) recommending that manufacturers offer pedal extension attachments for short people who request them.
The petitioner also requested that the agency consider alternatives for the period after the next several years, including that NHTSA recommend that manufacturers use available voluntary consensus standards organizations or professional societies to draft recommended practices for air bag safety within the requirements of the original Standard No. 208.
The petitioner stated that he opposes rulemaking to add major requirements to reduce the potential of harm from air bag deployment. Mr. Friedman stated that it took 20 years to get the automatic crash protection standard in place, and it is unlikely that the agency could make a major revision of this standard effective in less than a decade.
After carefully considering Mr. Friedman's petition, the agency has decided to deny it. NHTSA believes that it considered a reasonable range of interim approaches for addressing the problem of adverse effects from air bags, and that the temporary depowering amendment was a reasonable part of the interim approach selected by the agency.
The agency notes that it addressed a range of alternatives in both the NPRM and the final rule for depowering. Contrary to the allegation of the petitioner, NHTSA did not take at face value the industry's claim that the only way it can respond to the current situation is to depower air bags. In the final rule on depowering, NHTSA explained its position on this subject as follows:
NHTSA notes that, in its January 1997 proposal, it discussed a variety of alternative approaches for addressing the adverse effects of air bags, including higher deployment thresholds, dual level inflators, smart air bags, and various other changes to air bags. In issuing its proposal, the agency recognized that, for many vehicles, depowering has a shorter lead time than any of the other alternatives. The agency also explained that a change in Standard No. 208 is not needed to permit manufacturers to implement these other alternatives. The agency explained further:
" The agency expects to ultimately require smart air bags through rulemaking. In the meantime, the agency is not endorsing depowering over other solutions. Instead, the agency is proposing a regulatory change to add depowering to the alternatives available to the vehicle manufacturers to address this problem on a short-term basis. To the extent that manufacturers can implement superior alternatives for some vehicles, the agency would encourage them to do so."
NHTSA shares the concern of the Parent's Coalition that depowering will not likely save all children and will likely result in trade-offs for adults. That is why the agency is limiting the duration of its depowering amendments and plans to conduct rulemaking to require smart air bags. In the meantime, however, NHTSA wants to be sure that the vehicle manufacturers have the necessary tools to address immediately the problem of adverse effects of air bags. Standard No. 208's existing performance requirements do restrict the use of depowering, since substantially depowering the air bags of many vehicles would make those vehicles incapable of complying with the standard's injury criteria in a 30 mph barrier crash test. Accordingly, to permit use of this alternative, it is necessary to amend Standard No. 208.
The issuance of any rule narrowing the discretion that vehicle manufacturers have had since the 1984 decision, whether by requiring depowering, higher thresholds, other changes to air bags, or smart air bags, would involve considerably more complex issues than a rulemaking simply adding greater flexibility. The agency would need to assess safety effects, practicability, and leadtime for the entire vehicle fleet. NHTSA will assess those types of issues in its rulemaking for smart air bags. The agency notes that there may not be any reason to have higher deployment thresholds with some types of smart air bags, since a low-power inflation may be automatically selected for low severity crashes.
Until the agency conducts its rulemaking regarding smart air bags, it believes it is best to focus on ensuring that manufacturers have appropriate flexibility to address the problem of adverse effects of air bags. This will enable the manufacturers to select the solutions which can be accomplished most quickly for their individual models. NHTSA encourages the vehicle manufacturers to use the best available alternative solutions that can be quickly implemented for their vehicles, whether depowering, higher thresholds, other changes to air bags, smart air bags, or a combination of the above. The agency notes again that the vehicle manufacturers need not wait for further rulemaking to begin installing smart air bags, and encourages them to move in that direction expeditiously.
NHTSA notes that Mr. Friedman did not address or challenge the specific rationales provided by the agency for the temporary depowering amendment. Moreover, he did not address the agency's overall comprehensive plan of rulemaking and other actions addressing the adverse effects of air bags, or explain why his various recommendations constitute a better approach. (This comprehensive plan was discussed in the depowering final rule at 62 FR 12961-62). Accordingly, the agency has concluded that the petitioner has not provided a basis for reopening the depowering rulemaking.
1. "Crash pulse" means the acceleration-time history of the occupant compartment of a vehicle during a crash. This is represented typically in terms of g's of acceleration plotted against time in milliseconds (1/1000 second). The crash pulse for a given test is a major determinant of the stringency of the test, and how representative the test is of how a particular vehicle will perform in particular kinds of real world crashes.
Generally speaking, the occupant undergoes greater forces due to secondary collisions with the vehicle interior and restraint systems if the crash pulse g's are higher at the peak, or the duration of the crash pulse is shorter, which would lead to higher overall average g levels.
In a relatively "hard" pulse crash, a vehicle's occupant compartment decelerates relatively abruptly, creating a high risk of death or serious injury. In a relatively "soft" pulse crash, there is a lower rate of deceleration and proportionately lower risk of death or serious injury. The nature of the crash pulse for a vehicle in a given frontal crash is affected by a number of factors, including vehicle speed, the extent to which the vehicle structure forward of the occupant compartment collapses in a controlled manner so that some of the crash energy is absorbed, whether the struck object is fixed in place, the extent to which the struck object collapses and absorbs energy, and, in the case of non-fixed struck objects, the relative mass of the vehicle and the struck object. Large cars typically have relatively mild crash pulses, while small cars and utility vehicles typically have more severe crash pulses.
2. As discussed elsewhere in this notice, Standard No. 208 currently includes an option for manufacturers to certify their vehicles to an unbelted sled test as an alternative to the unbelted barrier test requirement.
3. 60 FR 35126, July 6, 1995.
4. The term "carline" refers to a group of vehicles which has a degree of commonality in construction (e.g., body, chassis). The term is used in NHTSA's automobile parts content labeling program and is defined at 49 CFR § 583.4.
5. The most significant objection is the argument that air bags designed to enable vehicles to meet the unbelted barrier test at 30 mph will be too powerful for occupants, especially children, who are extremely close to the air bag at time of deployment. The agency notes, however, that this objection has been made primarily in the context of the continued use of current, single inflation level air bags, instead of the advanced ones that are the subject of this proposal. Another significant objection concerns how representative the barrier test is of real world crashes. As discussed later in this notice, NHTSA is placing in the docket a technical paper which analyzes the representativeness of those requirements with respect to real-world crashes which have a potential to cause serious injury or fatality.
6. The NHTSA Reauthorization Act of 1998 is part of P.L. 105-178.
7. The vast majority of the deaths appear to have occurred in crashes in which the vehicle had a change in velocity of less than 15 mph. Almost all occurred in crashes with a change of velocity less than 20 mph.
8. The Federal safety standards do not require a "one-size-fits-all" approach to designing air bags. They permit a wide variety of technologies that would enable air bags to deploy with less force in lower speed crashes or when occupants are out of position or suppress deployment altogether in appropriate circumstances.
9. In States with "secondary" seat belt use laws, a motorist may be ticketed for failure to wear a seat belt only if there is a separate basis for stopping the motorist, such as the violation of a separate traffic law. This hampers enforcement of the law. In States with primary laws, a citation can be issued solely because of failure to wear seat belts.
10. Studies published in the November 5, 1997 issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) and by the Center for Risk Analysis at the Harvard School of Public Health confirm the overall value of passenger air bags, while urging action be taken quickly to address the loss of children's lives due to those air bags. IIHS found that passenger air bags were associated with a substantial reduction in crash deaths. The Center evaluated the cost-effectiveness of passenger air bags and concluded that they produce savings at costs comparable to many well-accepted medical and public health practices.
11. 39 of the 48 forward-facing children who were fatally injured by air bags were not using any type of belt or other restraint. The remaining children included some who were riding with their shoulder belts behind them and some who were wearing lap and shoulder belts but who also should have been in booster seats because of their small size and weight. Booster seat use could have improved shoulder belt fit and performance. These various factors and pre-crash braking allowed the children to get too close to the air bag when it began to inflate.
12. For example, Mercedes-Benz offers passenger air bags whose deployment threshold is 12 mph if the passenger is unbelted and 18 mph if the passenger is belted.
13. The passenger-side air bags installed in approximately 10,000 GM cars in the 1970's were equipped with dual stage inflators. Today, for example, Autoliv, a Swedish manufacturer of air bags, has a "gas generator that inflates in two steps, giving the bag time to unfold and the vent holes to be freed before the second inflation starts. Should the bag then encounter an occupant, any excessive gas -- and indeed bag pressure -- will exit through the vent holes."
14. Air bag firsts--In view of the confusion evident in some public comments in recent rulemakings and even in some media accounts about when air bags were first required, and by whom, the agency has set forth a brief chronology below:
1972 First year in which vehicle manufacturers had the option of installing air bags in passenger cars as a means of complying with Standard No. 208. Prior to that year, vehicle manufacturers had to comply means of installing manual lap and shoulder belts. GM installed driver and passenger air bags in approximately 10,000 passenger cars in the mid-1970's.
1986 First year in which vehicle manufacturers no longer had the option of installing manual belts and were required instead to install some type of automatic protection (either automatic belts or air bags) in some passenger cars. This requirement was issued by Secretary Dole in 1984. At the time of that issuance, the agency expressly noted that vehicle manufacturers had expressed concerns about air bags and out-of-position occupants. In response to those concerns, NHTSA identified a variety of technological remedies whose use was permissible under the Standard. Between 1986 and 1996, vehicle manufacturers chose to comply with the automatic protection requirements by installing over 35 million driver air bags and over 18 million passenger air bags in passenger cars. Another 12 million driver air bags and almost 3 million passenger air bags were installed in light trucks in that same time period.
1996 First year in which vehicle manufacturers were required to install air bags in some passenger cars. This requirement was mandated by the 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991.
15. At least 80 percent of each manufacturer's light trucks manufactured on or after September 1, 1997 and before September 1, 1998 must be equipped with an air bag and a manual lap/shoulder belt. Every light truck manufactured on or after September 1, 1998 must be so equipped.
16. For a discussion of the actions taken by NHTSA before November 1996 to address the adverse effects of air bags, see pp. 40787-88 of the agency's NPRM published August 6, 1996 (61 FR 40784).
17. NHTSA notes that JPL, in identifying and analyzing parameters to reflect the functions that may be required of advanced technology, classified those parameters by the information provided about the crash and the occupants and the air bag system response.
18. For information concerning the agency's research program, interested persons are referred to the agency's Report to Congress, Status Report on Establishing a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard for Frontal Offset Crash Testing, April 1997. This report is available on NHTSA's web site. The address for the section of the web site where this report is located is "http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/CrashWorthy/".
19. The agency's initial steps regarding technological solutions focused on depowering primarily because the lead time needed for depowering was significantly shorter than the lead time for the technological solutions that are the subject of this proposal.
20. See 61 FR 40784, 40791-92, August 6, 1996; 61 FR 60206, November 27, 1996.
21. These guidelines are available on NHTSA's website at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/ems/airbag/.
22. For a further discussion of this subject, see NHTSA's final rule concerning on-off switches, 62 FR 62406, 62420 (footnote 23), November 21, 1997.
23. As discussed elsewhere in this notice, the standard currently includes an unbelted sled test option that may be selected as an alternative to the unbelted barrier test.
24. In its 1984 decision, the Department had expressly recognized that the vehicle manufacturers had raised concerns about potential adverse effects of air bags to out-of-position occupants. In response to those concerns, the Department had identified a variety of available technological means for addressing those risks. The July 11, 1984 Final Regulatory Impact Analysis (FRIA) listed a variety of potential technological means for addressing the problem of injuries associated with air bag deployments (FRIA, pp. III-8 to 10) including dual level inflation systems and other technological measures such as bag shape and size, instrument panel contour, aspiration, and inflation technique. It also noted that a variety of different sensors could be used to trigger dual level inflation systems, e.g., a sensor that measures impact speed, a sensor that measures occupant size or weight and senses whether an occupant is out of position; and an electronic proximity sensor. However, the auto manufacturers generally did not adopt any of these technologies.
25. The sled test alternative adopted by NHTSA, with a 125 msec pulse, had a more stringent pulse than the one first advocated by AAMA. That organization first recommended a 143 msec pulse. However, testing by NHTSA showed that a vehicle could pass Standard No. 208's requirements without an air bag with the 143 msec pulse. The more stringent pulse was recommended by AAMA in a later submission. Further testing by the agency showed that some vehicles could pass Standard No. 208's requirements without an air bag even with the 125 msec pulse. Given this testing, NHTSA added new neck injury criteria to the sled test alternative, to help ensure that the vehicle manufacturers did not depower their air bags to a point where they would provide little benefit.
26. The National Occupant Protection Use Survey (NOPUS) reported in August 1997 that young adults (16-24 years old) were observed with the lowest belt use rate (less than 50%) of any of the reported observed categories. The NOPUS data report findings of trained observers at controlled intersections. A copy of the NOPUS report is available at the NHTSA web site under the category "Reports and Research Notes".
27. Depowering has a very short leadtime because it can be accomplished simply by reducing the amount of propellant in existing air bag designs. If longer leadtime is assumed, however, manufacturers can make air bags less aggressive by means such as changing folding patterns and deployment paths, with a smaller chance of creating difficulties with respect to the barrier test requirements.
28. These vehicles included the Taurus, Explorer, Neon, Camry and Accord.
29. The vehicles which passed the standard's injury criteria by significant margins included the Taurus, Explorer, Caravan, Camry and Accord. The exception was the Neon.
